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Abstract: Financial bubbles are subject to debate and controversy. However, they are not 
well understood and are hardly ever characterised specifically, especially ex ante. We define 
a bubble as a period of unsustainable growth, when the price of an asset increases ever 
more quickly, in a series of accelerating phases of corrections and rebounds. More 
technically, during a bubble phase, the price follows a faster-than-exponential power law 
growth process, often accompanied by log-periodic oscillations. This dynamic ends abruptly 
in a change of regime that may be a crash or a substantial correction. Because they leave 
such specific traces, bubbles may be recognised in advance: that is, before they burst. In this 
paper, we will explain the mechanism behind financial bubbles in an intuitive way. We will 
show how the log-periodic power law emerges spontaneously from the complex system that 
financial markets are as a consequence of feedback mechanisms, hierarchical structure and 
specific trading dynamics and investment styles.  
We argue that the risk of a major correction, or even a crash, becomes substantial when a 
bubble develops towards maturity, and that it is therefore very important to find evidence of 
bubbles and to follow their development from as early a stage as possible. The tools that are 
explained in this paper actually serve that purpose. They are at the core of the Financial 
Crisis Observatory at the ETH in Zurich where tens of thousands of assets are monitored on 
a daily basis. This allows us to have a continuous overview of emerging bubbles in the global 
financial markets. The report available as part of the Notenstein white paper series (2014) 
with the title “Financial Bubbles: Mechanism, diagnostic and state of the world (Feb. 2014)” 
presents a practical application of the methodology outlined in this article and describes our 
view on the status of positive and negative bubbles in the financial markets, as of the end of 
January 2014. 
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1- The dog that did not bark 
In a tale by Arthur Conan Doyle, Sherlock Holmes draws the attention of Scotland Yard 
detectives to the curious behavior of the dog in the night when the race horse Silver Blaze 
was stolen. One of the officers objects that the dog did nothing. “That, was the curious 
incident”, replies Holmes. While the inspectors are totally absorbed by the nitty-gritty details 
of the case, Holmes takes a step back to get a broader perspective. Thanks to this eccentric 
approach, he quickly finds the key to solve the mystery. The horse’s trainer committed the 
crime. For once, it was not the butler. 
 
This story is reminiscent of what Paul Krugman, the winner of the 2008 Nobel Memorial Prize 
in Economic Sciences, calls up-and-down economics. Individual market movements are 
scrutinized as if they provide crucial clues to solve a mystery. Especially in the media and on 
the blogosphere, up-and-down price movements are covered like the exchange of shots 
during a tennis match. One day, stocks are down, fear is switched on and the Euro zone is in 
danger of total collapse. The next day, the whole lot turns around and Europeans can heave 
a sigh in relief. In this soap opera of self-fulfilling prophecy and wishful thinking, it is difficult 
to find the forest through the trees and to focus on the real nature of the financial system 
hidden behind the ephemeral details. 
 
By its nature, trading is carried out by interacting players connected in a hierarchical network 
structure who affect one another continuously. As such, financial markets are open, adaptive, 
out-of-equilibrium systems that are subject to nonlinear dynamics, created particularly but not 
only by imitation and herd behaviour. Such structures are extremely hard to model, and it is 
practically impossible to understand their behaviour in full detail. In fact, this assertion can be 
formalised by algorithmic Information theory – a combination of Shannon's information theory 
and Turing's computability theory – stating that, in a nutshell, most dynamic systems are 
intrinsically unpredictable (“computationally irreducible”). This is related to Gödel's 
incompleteness theorem in mathematical logic.  
 
However, if we take a step back and look at the broader, lower-resolution picture, 
predictability creeps back in and one can often be surprised to discover unexpected 
emerging macroscopic properties, like financial bubbles. The realisation that predictability is 
actually possible, if the right scales are chosen and thoughtful questions are asked, is a key 
insight on which our research in the last two decades has been built.  
 
This can be illustrated by many everyday-life observations. When the plug is pulled out of the 
bathtub it opens the system and pushes it out of equilibrium; a large-scale vortex will then 
often appear. A detailed knowledge of the water molecules, of the bathtub’s shape, or of the 
force used to pull the plug out will not help to understand the emergence of this coherent 
structure. Other fascinating examples of emergent macroscopic organisations are schools of 
anchovies or flocks of starlings, capable, in the absence of any conductor or leader, of 
beautiful choreographic movements, which emerge from the repeated use of basic rules of 
repulsion and attraction between the individual animals. Similarly, the heart beats as a result 
of self-organised rotating spiral waves of electro-mechanical activity that contribute to a 
spontaneous pacemaker. Out of the apparent chaos at a lower level emerges a predictable 
order at a higher level. 
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To understand the complexity around us, and especially in economics and finance, we need 
to step back from traditional concepts such as utility maximisation or equilibrium in closed 
systems, and use innovative ways of thinking to discover sometimes surprisingly simple 
rules. This is our line of attack. We look at financial markets from an alternative viewpoint, in 
the way Sherlock Holmes solves mysteries. This allows us to better understand the specific 
emerging macroscopic structure of financial bubbles, the extraordinary occurrence of great 
over-valuation over transient periods that, we argue, largely shapes the way economies and 
nations develop. Like swarms of birds or fishes, bubbles are the result of subtle forms of 
interaction and organisation within a system – this time, the financial system.  
 
In the following section, we give an intuitive explanation of our bubble-tracking model. We 
argue that the risk of a major correction, or even a crash, becomes substantial when a 
bubble develops towards maturity, and that it is therefore very important to find evidence of 
bubbles and to follow their development from as early a stage as possible. This is the goal of 
the Financial Crisis Observatory (FCO) at the ETH Zurich (the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology), where we monitor more than twenty-five thousand financial time series on a 
daily basis.  
 
First, though, let us explain why bubbles appear, how they are intimately linked to our 
financial system, and why studying and understanding them has never been more relevant 
than today. 
 
 
2- Economics of boom and bust 
 
In an article for the Notenstein Academy White Paper Series entitled A Creepy World [1], we 
argued that the dynamics behind business cycles are highly nonlinear and extremely 
asymmetric. We compared this with mechanical creep, where long periods of falsely 
perceived stability and status quo are terminated by extreme events that reset the system. In 
business, this is caused by the dynamic interaction between innovation and speculation. As a 
wave of new innovations flourishes, a boom sets in. New companies are created with the 
purpose of producing and commercialising these new technological inventions. These 
companies, however, are generally cash-poor. The wave of innovation can proceed only 
through financial intermediation from established, cash-generating enterprises to new, cash-
absorbing businesses. As a result, periods of high innovation are accompanied by an 
increase in the size of the financial industry. William Janeway, an American venture capital 
investor, with over 40 years of experience, has provided an accessible way of understanding 
the dynamics behind the innovation economy in his recent book [2]. In his view, informed 
both by practice and theory, the innovation economy begins with discovery and culminates in 
speculation, with continuous positive feedback loops between the two. Over some 250 years, 
so his argument goes, economic growth has been driven by successive processes of trial 
and error: upstream explorations in research and inventions and downstream experiments in 
exploiting the new economic space opened by innovation. This interpretation offers an 
original theory about the role of asset bubbles in financing technological innovation, and 
about the specific role played by the state in enabling innovation processes [2, 3]. The over-
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reach associated with the bubbles and the disproportional growth of the banking industry 
finally causes a collapse and puts an end to the cycle. The process then can start again with 
a new wave of innovations. 
 
In “1980-2014, the Illusion of the Perpetual Money Machine and what it bodes for the future” 
[4], we explained that we are currently in such an over-reach phase of disproportionate 
financialisation, associated with a succession of bubbles and crashes culminating in the 
financial crisis of 2008. This prompted central banks worldwide to take unprecedented 
actions, including an extended and still on-going period of very low interest rates, as well as 
“unconventional” policies such as asset purchases and long-term provision of liquidity to 
banks. This is what the International Monetary Fund (IMF) refers to as “Monetary Policy Plus” 
(MP-plus). In a recent Global Financial Stability Report [5], an explicit warning is given: “… 
MP-plus may have undesirable side effects, including some that may put financial stability at 
risk. Ample bank liquidity may raise credit risk at banks by compromising underwriting and 
loan quality standards, and it may encourage a delay in necessary balance sheet repair and 
bank restructuring. Likewise, low interest rates encourage other financial institutions, 
including pension funds, insurance companies, and money market mutual funds, to increase 
risk by “searching for yield”. A search for yield can help push the market value of some 
assets beyond their fundamental value (“bubbles”) …” 
 
To fight the crisis that was the most recent culmination of a recurring pattern of bubbles and 
crashes, central banks introduced MP-plus, about which the IMF warns that it increases the 
risk of … bubbles. This anomaly is well captured by the shocking statement of L. Summers, 
previous Secretary of the US Treasury and president emeritus of Harvard University, in an 
article in the Financial Times on 12 June 2011: “The central irony of the financial crisis is that 
while it is caused by too much confidence, borrowing and lending, and spending, it is only 
resolved by increases in confidence, borrowing and lending, and spending.” 
 
In these uncertain times, a better understanding of financial bubbles, which are hardly ever 
characterised specifically, has never been more relevant.  
 
3- Bubble mechanics 
3.1 Fundamental value, efficient markets and irrational exuberance 
During bubbles, prices move away from their so-called fundamental value; where, during 
positive bubbles, there is excessive demand and, during negative bubbles, there is 
disproportionate selling. But, before going deeper into explaining and defining bubbles, what 
do we actually know about this “fundamental value”? 
 
In his 1985 presidential address to the American Finance Association [6], Fischer Black 
elaborated on the effect of noise in financial markets. He recognised that, without noise, 
there would be no trading, but the reverse of the medal is that, because of noise, “We are 
forced to act largely in the dark” [6]. An efficient market, according to Black, “is one in which 
price is within a factor of two of (the true) value” [6]. 
 
Black’s heuristic can be easily checked using the Gordon-Shapiro dividend discount model. 
The formula (given in Equation 2 below) is highly intuitive, and is based on the fact that the 
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total return r obtained by investing in a stock is the sum of its dividend yield D/P (where D is 
the dividend and P is the price) and of the growth rate g of the dividend (which is also the 
growth rate of the price): 
 
(1) 
 
 
Rearranging the factors gives us the basic stock pricing formula: 
 
(2) 
 
Suppose that, on an annual basis, the expected dividend (D) is 100, the total return (r) 8 
percent and the growth rate (g) 4 percent. Then, the stock would be worth 2,500. Now, by 
simply reducing the expected total return from 8 percent to 6 percent, the expected stock 
price doubles to 5,000, for the same dividend and growth expectations. Reducing the 
expected return increases the price: this may seem counter-intuitive but simply results from 
the fact that r is also the rate by which to discount the future dividends; thus a smaller 
discount rate gives more value to future incomes and so increases the present price. The 
same mechanism links yields and bond prices. In the long run, adjusted for annual inflation, 
US stock returns have averaged about 7 percent. So, if one investor uses an expectation of 6 
percent and the other one of 8 percent, the difference between their pricing will be a factor of 
two.  
 
Clearly, this is a simplification, and other more advanced discounted cash flow models exist. 
Nevertheless, the conclusion generally holds: when pricing stocks, estimates of different 
factors such as dividends, returns and growth expectations are needed, small differences in 
these estimates, especially those appearing in the denominator, may result in large 
deviations in the expected price. As most estimates are based on historical data, valuing 
stocks is a bit like driving in the dark while looking in the rear-view mirror, even in efficient 
markets.  
 
This reasoning would suggest that the search for the fair value of an asset or a project is a 
vain quest. However, this is where the power of the financial markets comes into play: by 
voting with his or her wallet, each investor contributes to the collective knowledge, and the 
aggregate information is revealed in the asset price. This mechanism driven by “the wisdom 
of crowds” transcends the above formula and provides prices that are in general reasonable 
and reflect a useful and workable consensus. In financial jargon, this is called the “efficient-
market hypothesis”, introduced by Paul Samuelson and Eugene Fama, the latter being the 
joint recipient of the 2013 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences.  
 
Robert Shiller, one of the other recipients of the same prize, was honoured ironically for 
spearheading the opposite notion that markets, at times, exhibit “irrational exuberance” [7]. 
While the efficient-market hypothesis provides a useful first-order representation of financial 
markets in normal times, situations can be observed in which the anchor of a fundamental 
price is shaky and future gains are characterised by serious uncertainties. Our research 
shows that the absence of a strong anchor, a well-defined fundamental value to which the 
g
P
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−
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price can be attached, provides a fertile environment for the occurrence of bubbles. When a 
number of additional elements are present, markets experience transient phases in which 
they disconnect in specific, dangerous ways from the fundamental value. These are 
situations in which investors are following the herd, and pushing a price up on an 
unsustainable growth trajectory. We define these as financial bubbles and explain their 
specific characteristics in the following sections. 
 
3.2 Bubble definition 
“I wonder how much it would take to buy a soap bubble, if there were only one in the world.” 
Mark Twain. 
 
A bubble starts with a new opportunity or expectation. This can be a ground-breaking new 
technology, the access to a new market, or a significant technical trading event such as the 
breaking of a support line. In any case, there must be a good story about terrific future 
prospects. Smart money flows in at the early stage, which leads to a first wave of price 
appreciation. Attracted by the prospect of extrapolated higher returns, more investors follow. 
At some point, demand goes up as the price increases, and the price goes up as the demand 
increases. This is a positive feedback mechanism, which fuels a spiralling growth away from 
equilibrium. As when pulling the plug out of the bathtub, the equilibrium has been broken and 
there is no longer any serious price determination at the intersection of supply and demand.   
 
This phenomenon should not be confused with the uncertainties concerning fundamental 
value under conditions of noise, as it was described by Fischer Black. During a bubble, the 
market has changed structurally and entered a completely new regime, which is entirely 
driven by sentiment and no longer reflects any real underlying value. At some point, often 
when liquidity starts to dry out due to central banks raising rates and/or foreign capital no 
longer flowing in, investors start questioning whether the process is sustainable. Often, this is 
followed in short order by a market collapse resulting from the synchronisation of sell orders. 
The crash occurs because the market has entered an unstable phase after a long maturation 
process associated with the inflation of the bubble. At this stage, like a ruler held up vertically 
on one finger, any small disturbance can trigger a fall. This mechanism is often not well 
understood and much controversy then arises about the cause of the crash. In reality, the 
cause is quite obvious and is found in the preceding years of exuberant bubble dynamics 
that have made the whole construct fragile. Thus, it is no surprise that it can collapse on the 
smallest of shocks. As we show below, this insight offers us the possibility of advanced 
diagnosis of developing bubbles, the Holy Grail for any investor interested in protecting his or 
her portfolio. 
 
3.3 Bubbles are processes of unsustainable growth 
“Whenever you find yourself on the side of the majority, it is time to pause and reflect.” Mark 
Twain. 
 
3.3.1 Cause and effect 
By nature, a financial bubble is an unsustainable process in which the system is gradually 
pushed towards criticality. In a critical system, small events can have huge impacts. There is 
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no point in arguing about local causes and consequences when the system has reached a 
critical state, as it is the criticality that matters.  
 
This point is nicely illustrated by the many discussions and controversies on the cause of the 
recent global financial crisis. It is generally accepted that the 2007–2009 recession in the US 
was triggered, in some way, by the correction in the housing market after its peak early in 
2006. As house prices started to level off, wealth extraction, associated with mortgage 
renegotiations and purchases made for pure capital gains, began to stall. In consequence, a 
growing number of homeowners found themselves owing more on their mortgages than their 
homes were worth. Consequently, the rate of defaults and foreclosures skyrocketed, 
especially in the subprime segment, with the particularly loose underwriting standards that 
had previously led to its disproportional growth. Additionally, the previous years had seen a 
wave of financial innovations. New structured credit products, like CDOs (collateralised debt 
obligations) and MBSs (mortgage-backed securities), were developed. Because of them, and 
the fact that many of them were additionally insured against losses by AIG, the international 
insurance and financial services company, the decline in house prices infected the global 
financial system, leading to the potential systemic risk of a global freeze. 
 
This is, however, a quite unsatisfactory explanation, as the question of why exactly the US 
housing market stopped appreciating remains open. If it had continued to expand at its 
previous rate, fulfilling the expectation of most market participants based on its behaviour 
over the preceding century, in which real estate had almost never disappointed, it is likely 
that the crisis would have been averted, or at least postponed. In the following sections, we 
explain that house prices had followed an unsustainable track, which brought the market to a 
critical state characterised by the existence of an intrinsic end-point. Thus, growth could not 
continue and once it reached the critical point, anything might have triggered the change of 
regime.  
 
It is now time to explain how unsustainable growth differs from sustainable growth and what 
precisely characterises a critical system.  
 
3.3.2 Faster-than-exponential growth 
“For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that 
hath not shall be taken even that which he hath.” Matthew 25:29, King James Version [8]. 
 
Generally, capital grows exponentially. That is why, most often, market movements or 
economic growth are reported in percentage returns, and why we are used to hearing 
phrases like “last year, GDP grew 1.7 percent”, or, “last year, the Swiss Market Index rose 18 
percent”. This is caused by the mechanism of compound interest rates, which in science is 
called a proportional growth process.  
 
A very good and clear definition can be found on Wikipedia [9]: 
“A proportional growth process is any of a class of processes in which some quantity, 
typically some form of wealth or credit, is distributed among a number of individuals or 
objects according to how much they already have, so that those who are already wealthy 
receive more than those who are not.” 
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In sociology, this is also called the “Matthew effect”, in reference to the quotation above. The 
process is also often summarised in the aphorism “the rich get richer and the poor get 
poorer”. 
 
When resources are unlimited, exponential growth can go on indefinitely. This is different in 
systems of finite size, where there is competition for limited resources, such as a species 
population growing under Darwinian competition. If a pair of sheep is put on an island, to 
begin with growth will be exponential, as the resources will be practicality unlimited for the 
small population. However, the available food can feed only a limited number of sheep. As 
the population approaches its limit, given by the carrying capacity of the island, the growth 
rate slows down due to the negative feedback of competition for the scarce food. Eventually, 
growth will stop and a dynamic equilibrium between the available food and the sheep 
population will be reached. Such a growth process under competition is called logistic growth 
and the equilibrium is the general result of the presence of negative feedbacks, which have a 
stabilising effect. Precisely this scenario unfolded when sheep were introduced on the island 
of Tasmania around 1800 [10]. The point of this explanation is that neither exponential nor 
logistic growth processes contain, in and of themselves, any endogenous cause of instability. 
In the first case, growth simply continues forever, in the second, growth stops and a steady 
state is reached. 
 
The key ingredient that sets off an unsustainable growth process, which is a prerequisite for 
a financial bubble, is positive feedback. This is also called pro-cyclicality in economics, and is 
the exact opposite of negative feedback. Positive feedback is often caused by imitation: 
when investors display herd behaviour, a price increase triggers even greater demand due to 
the strengthening of the herd, and the equilibrium of supply and demand breaks down, as 
when pulling the plug out of the bathtub. 
 
A classical example of a positive feedback mechanism that sets an unsustainable process in 
motion is the formation of droplets from a dripping tap. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Initially, 
the surface tension of the liquid keeps the droplet connected to the tap. But the droplet is 
pulled down by gravity and this gradually changes its shape. The process that leads to the 
fall is comparable to a climbing rope that snaps. When the first fibre breaks, the load is 
distributed over the remaining fibres. Each time a new fibre snaps, the load on the other 
fibres increases, leading ever more new fibres to break in what becomes a vicious circle. 
This is a positive feedback mechanism that leads to a runaway process: the failure of the 
rope. For the droplet, the thinner the neck holding it, the greater the stress applied to the 
liquid in this constriction, and the faster the flow that shrinks it; again a positive feedback. 
The thinning of the neck accelerates and ends in fracture, a finite-time singularity in the 
jargon of mathematicians. This translates into disconnection and the fall of the droplet. 
 
In order to develop an operational financial-bubble model, we need to translate this insight 
into mathematical vernacular. There are no positive feedback mechanisms in the standard 
financial models, which assume that the growth of asset prices is essentially a stochastic 
proportional process, fuelled by the mechanism of compound returns or interest rates. This 
means that, apart from its volatility, a stock price is supposed to grow, on average, 
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exponentially at a constant rate of return. When positive feedback is involved, the dynamics 
change drastically. Now, the growth rate is no longer constant, but starts growing itself, which 
makes the price follow a (faster-than-exponential) hyperbolic course until, at some point, the 
growth rate becomes so large that the price hits a wall and the model breaks down. In 
physics and mathematics, such a point is called a singularity. Figure 2 illustrates the 
difference between exponential and hyperbolic growth. It shows that the latter can be quite 
deceptive, following a gentler slope than the former for the major part of its development and 
then surpassing its growth rate in the final stage. Furthermore, exponential growth can 
continue mathematically ad infinitum, whereas hyperbolic growth reaches a point of instability 
at which the price process ceases to exist. This is the point where the system becomes 
critical. Using our mechanical metaphor, it is when the thin neck holding the droplet fractures 
or the climbing rope fails.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The formation of a droplet is an example of a positive feedback mechanism that sets in motion an 
unsustainable process ending with a finite-time singularity, namely the fracture of the thin neck and the fall of the 
droplet (reproduced from [11]). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The difference between exponential and hyperbolic growth. Growth without positive feedback can 
continue ad infinitum; growth with positive feedback diverges and reaches a critical point where the model breaks 
down. In this example, the singularity is put at time step 100. Because the model does not give any solution 
beyond that point, the value is then put at zero. Note also that, for the major part of the process, hyperbolic growth 
follows a gentler slope than exponential growth, overtaking its growth rate only towards the end. 
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This is a very powerful insight that can be used to analyse financial time series. In principle, 
by verifying mathematically whether the price follows a hyperbolic course instead of an 
exponential one, it can be determined whether a positive feedback mechanism, which 
characterises the bubble phase of an asset, is at work. If this is the case, the price trajectory 
cannot be sustainable and a critical point will be reached at which a change in the market will 
occur. That is the point where the risk of a crash or a major correction is highest.  
 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The price of Bitcoin before the major correction at the end of November 2013. A hyperbolic process is 
needed to reflect the steep rise in the price at the final stage of the bubble. This is the hallmark of a positive 
feedback mechanism and of the existence of a bubble 
(Source: http://bitcoincharts.com/charts/mtgoxUSD#rg180ztgSzm1g10zm2g25zv). 
 
The non-sustainable character of a price trajectory under the influence of positive feedback is 
illustrated in Figure 3, which shows the development of the price of Bitcoin (the digital 
currency introduced in 2009) before the major correction at the end of November 2013. It can 
be clearly seen that the exponential function (in blue) is not a good model for capturing the 
price dynamics, which is characterised by a slow initial rise followed by ever accelerating 
growth until the breakpoint. It attempts to portray the real dynamics with an average 
annualised growth rate of almost 700 percent, which is much too large for most of the period 
and too small for the final stage. The reason for this discrepancy is that the growth rate has 
not been constant but has itself been growing, as shown in Figure 4. This acceleration in the 
growth rate is captured well by the hyperbolic growth model. This analysis enabled the 
diagnosis that Bitcoin was in a bubble and that a correction would come when the market 
entered a critical state as a result of positive feedback mechanisms. 
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Figure 4: The monthly growth rate of Bitcoin before the major correction at the end of November 2013. It can be 
clearly seen that the growth rate is itself growing; this is caused by a positive feedback mechanism, for instance 
herd behaviour. During this period of excessive growth of the growth rate itself, the asset is in a bubble phase 
(Source: http://bitcoincharts.com/charts/mtgoxUSD#rg180ztgSzm1g10zm2g25zv). 
 
 
There are many positive feedback mechanisms. They can be classified into two broad 
classes: (i) technical/rational and (ii) behavioural.   
 
In the first class we find, for instance, option hedging and portfolio insurance techniques. 
Option hedging is the simple implementation of the Black-Scholes option theory, in which the 
risk associated with selling, say, a call option is eliminated (in a Gaussian world) by buying 
more of the underlying asset if the price has gone up recently and vice-versa. This is clearly 
a positive feedback strategy since the higher the price, the higher the demand becomes. 
Ronnie Sircar and George Papanicolaou have shown, for instance, that taking such hedging 
strategies into account, actually leads to a significant increase in the volatility of the 
underlying asset of the option [12].  
Portfolio insurance techniques refer to the synthetic put option strategy developed by Leland 
and Rubinstein to hedge against market downturns. The problem is that its large-scale 
adoption in the 1980s by a number of big financial investment funds contributed significantly 
to the severity of the Black Monday crash on 19 October 1987, since it created strong selling 
pressure as the price went down. Trend-following investment strategies are clearly pro-
cyclical, as, for instance, a recognised previous upward trend sends a signal to buy, 
supporting further price rises. We think that algorithm trading is also increasingly contributing 
to the creation of positive feedback periods on the markets, due to the adaptive and learning 
abilities of the algorithms, which tend to identify strategies with similar performance, leading 
to herd behaviour.  
The crisis that started in the USA in 2007 has once again illuminated the pro-cyclical nature 
of the way banks finance companies by making more credit available in booms and by 
limiting credit in periods of contraction. Additionally, it confirmed the cyclical behaviour of 
deregulation in good times and reintroducing new regulation after crises. The learning 
process in business networks and the build-up of human capital are other positive feedback 
mechanisms. Different kinds of execution processes, such as stop-loss orders, market 
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makers’ bid-ask spread optimisation in response to past volatility, and the optimisation of 
trade-execution, also promote positive feedback loops on asset prices. 
 
Positive-feedback behavioural mechanisms include imitation and herd behaviour. It can, in 
fact, be proved that imitation turns out to be the optimum investment strategy in conditions of 
serious uncertainty, since the price, which results from the aggregate polling of decisions, 
can be proxied by the aggregate sentiments of one’s “friends”. We see that bubbles often 
develop in the presence of exciting stories concerning a novel investment opportunity, which 
is actually characterised by extreme uncertainty concerning the real future outcomes. 
Imitation and herd behaviour then both fuel the bubble and become the best strategy – until 
the bubble bursts. Robert Cialdini has documented the “social proof” mechanism [13], in 
which people will do things that they see other people are doing. For example, if one person 
looks up at the sky, bystanders will then also look up to see what he is looking at. This 
apparent mindless behaviour may actually reflect our innate tendency to use simple clues 
and heuristics that offered better chances of survival at the time we evolved into hunter-
gatherers about 200,000 years ago. 
  
 
3.3.3 Singularity 
We mentioned above the concept of a singularity, borrowed from physics and mathematics. 
This is a point at which a model breaks down and the equations no longer have any solution.  
 
Time	   Population	   Growth	  rate	   Doubling	  time	  (years)	  
0.00	   2	   2%	   34.65	  
34.65	   4	   4%	   34.65/2=	  	  17.33	  
51.98	   8	   8%	   34.65/4=	  	  	  	  8.66	  
60.64	   16	   16%	   34.65/8=	  	  	  	  4.33	  
64.97	   32	   32%	   34.65/16=	  	  	  2.17	  
67.13	   64	   64%	   34.65/32=	  	  	  1.08	  
68.22	   128	   128%	   34.65/64=	  	  	  0.54	  
68.76	   256	   256%	   34.65/128=	  	  0.27	  
69.03	   512	   512%	   34.65/256=	  	  0.14	  
69.16	   1024	   1024%	   34.65/512=	  	  0.07	  
 
Table 1: The first ten steps of a process in which an initial population of two grows at an initial rate of 2 percent 
and the growth rate doubles suddenly each time the population doubles, forming a succession of iterations. 
 
Take, for example, a population of two that increases with an initial growth rate of 2 percent. 
After 34.7 years, or roughly one generation, this population will have doubled. Now, suppose 
that the growth rate itself doubles with every new generation. Then, in the next step, the 
growth rate will be 4 percent and the doubling time 34.65/2=17.3 years; in the following step, 
the growth rate will be 8 percent and the doubling time 34.65/4=8.7 years and so on; Table 1 
shows the first ten steps of this accelerating growth dynamic. As the process develops, the 
population grows without limit, reaching infinity in the finite time of 34.65 + 34.65/2+34.65/4 + 
34.65/8 +... = 34.65 x (1+1/2 +1/4 +1/8+ ...). The infinite series illustrates Zeno’s famous 
paradox, which bothered the classical Greek mathematicians and philosophers. Zeno argued 
that an arrow should never reach its target since at any time it has to cover half the 
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remaining distance, and then again half the next remaining distance and so on, giving for the 
total remaining distance the infinite series 1/2 +1/4 +1/8+... . The Ancient Greeks struggled 
with the notion that such a summation containing an infinite number of summands could give 
a finite result. Starting with Cauchy’s theory of convergence, we now know that 1+1/2 +1/4 
+1/8+... is simply equal to 2. Thus, the process in Table 1 illustrates a finite-time singularity 
(see Figure 5), as the population goes through an infinite number of doublings in just 2x 
34.65=69.3 years. Mathematically, the process cannot continue beyond that time, and 
change is unavoidable: this may be a crash or a substantial correction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: When the growth rate itself grows, the process becomes unsustainable and ceases to exist at a critical 
point. Here, an initial population of two grows at an initial annual rate of 2 percent. Then, we assume that the 
growth rate doubles at each population doubling. The process reaches a finite-time singularity and cannot 
continue beyond 69.3 years. Mathematically, there must be a change at that point; in real life the change will 
occur slightly before it. Notice that the y-axis has a logarithmic scale. In such a representation, an exponential 
process with a constant growth rate would show as a straight line whose slope is the growth rate. 
 
Interestingly, in economics and finance, models that contain a finite-time singularity are 
automatically discarded because they violate the principle of “proof of existence” required for 
the construction of a bona-fide theory. In general, economic models are designed so as to 
ensure the existence of an equilibrium, or at least a solution at any point in time. Here, we 
take another view by accepting that the market can have different phases with distinct 
dynamics, depending on whether the pricing mechanism follows a sustainable or a non-
sustainable process. As a matter of fact, the non-existence of a solution is the key point in 
our methodology for predicting the end of a bubble. Rather than making naïve forecasts 
based on extrapolated trends, our intrinsically nonlinear approach allows us to identify 
different market regimes. Most importantly, it characterises the end of unsustainable phases, 
when the risk of a crash or a correction is greatest; the fact that the model actually breaks 
down contains the really important information.   
 
Such finite-time singularities may not be part of an economist’s mathematical toolbox yet, but 
they play an important role in natural sciences. Equations in physical theories often describe 
the emergence of singularities occurring in finite time, which are associated with important 
physical phenomena. For example, the Theory of General Relativity, developed by Einstein 
predicts that a black hole forms when a very massive star collapses at the end of its life 
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cycle, and that a gravitational singularity is created in finite time where space-time curvature 
becomes infinite. Other examples may be found in the theory of planet formation in the solar 
system, turbulence in fluids or plasmas, front genesis in meteorology, rupture and material 
failure, earthquakes, surface instabilities causing spikes or jets, and the Euler disc. 
 
 
3.3.4 US house prices revisited 
We now have all the tools to revisit, and answer, our initial question. If a slow-down and 
levelling off of US house prices was the factor that triggered the recent financial crisis, what 
made house prices stop rising? Figure 6 shows the levels and annual growth rates of US real 
house prices. Three corrections can be observed: in 1979, 1989 and the massive fall starting 
in 2006 that set off the crisis in 2007. It can be clearly seen that each drop was preceded by 
a steep rise in the growth rate. In each case, then, real-estate prices were on an 
unsustainable faster-than-exponential trajectory, which necessarily had to end. As we have 
explained above, the bursting of the bubble was the inevitable consequence of hyperbolic, 
faster-than-exponential price growth. In fact, using these concepts and the technical 
implementation described below, in June 2005 we published in the international scientific 
digital archive (http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0506027) a warning that the US real-estate 
market would experience radical change by mid-2006. The article was published in a 
scientific journal afterwards in 2006 [14]. This is a clear illustration of how the market 
functions like a dynamic system that experiences phases of unsustainable growth followed 
by corrections, and is in no way a system in equilibrium in which the fundamental price is 
discovered at the intersection of supply and demand. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: US real house prices between 1974 and 2014. Levels are shown in black and should be read on the 
left-hand axis. Annual growth rates are shown in blue and should be read on the right-hand axis. Three peaks in 
the growth rate are immediately followed by a correction. When the growth rate itself grows, the process becomes 
unstable and a correction follows around the critical point embedded in the faster-than-exponential growth 
process. (Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas international house price dataset, 
http://www.dallasfed.org/institute/houseprice/)  
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3.4 Market structure 
“The universe is built on a plan the profound symmetry of which is somehow present in the 
inner structure of our intellect.” Paul Valery. 
 
We have argued that a bubble is essentially an unsustainable process that is fed by a 
positive feedback mechanism. As a consequence, the growth rate itself grows and the price 
follows a hyperbolic power law trajectory ending in some critical point or singularity where the 
risk of a crash or a correction is very high. An example of such an idealized process was 
shown in figure 5.   
 
In reality, the process will not always be so smooth. Often, typical patterns of oscillations can 
be observed that are caused by specific dynamic and structural features of the market. By 
combining the hyperbolic power law that was described in the previous section and a model 
for these distinct oscillations that will be explained here, we will get to the log-periodic power 
law (LPPL) model, which is the workhorse of our present bubble detection methodology.  
 
In a ground-breaking paper in 1998 [15], Robin Dunbar, a professor of Evolutionary 
Psychology and Behavioral Ecology at the University of Liverpool, presented his “social brain 
hypothesis”. He argued that the evolution of primate brains was driven by the need to 
function in increasingly larger social groups. Dunbar based his conclusion on the observation 
of a strong relationship between the social group size and the relative neocortex volume in 
primates. Interestingly, his model revealed that, based on the brain size, humans have a 
cognitive limit of approximately 150 individuals with whom a coherent personal relationship 
can be maintained.  
 
More recent research by Zhou et al. [16] has refined and extended this hypothesis by 
discovering that this social group of 150 individuals has a marked discrete internal structure 
comprising a hierarchy of sub-groupings. In this order, the core is called the support clique. 
This is the nucleus, or family of three to five persons that support each other during periods 
of severe emotional or financial distress. The next level on top of this is called the sympathy 
group. It contains the persons with whom we have special ties, like, for example, the people 
we see at least once per month. This unit includes about twelve to twenty individuals, 
enclosing three to four support groups. The following level in this pattern is the band. That is 
a party of about 30 to 50 persons. Ethnographic data on hunter-gatherer societies has shown 
that this group corresponds to the typical size of overnight camps. This internal organization 
in support cliques, sympathy groups and bands is dynamical and may change continuously 
over time, but their membership is always drawn from the same set of typically 150 
individuals, defining in total 5 levels in the hierarchical organization when including the ego. 
 
The comprehensive and systematic study of Zhou et al [16] used a large data set on human 
grouping patterns documented by many previous scholars. By applying fractal analysis, they 
identified, with high statistical confidence, a discrete hierarchy of group sizes with a preferred 
scaling ratio between three and four. They write: “… rather than a single or a continuous 
spectrum of group sizes, humans spontaneously form groups of preferred sizes organized in 
a geometric series approximating 3-5, 9-15, 30-45, etc. Such discrete scale invariance could 
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be related to that identified in signatures of herding behavior in financial markets and might 
reflect a hierarchical processing of social nearness by human brains.” 
 
Interestingly, a similar organizational structure with a comparable scaling ratio of three to four 
can be found in the military where one typically finds sections (or squads), platoons, 
companies, battalions, regiments, divisions and corps. Zhou et al. [16] ask the following 
natural question: “Could it be that the army’s structures have evolved to mimic the natural 
hierarchical groupings of everyday social structures, thereby optimizing the cognitive 
processing of within-group interactions?” 
 
The point of this parenthesis into the study of social structures is that, if traders and investors 
organize in the same natural hierarchy, it will be reflected in the way they imitate each other 
and as such have an impact on their coordinated buy and sell orders. As a consequence, this 
discrete social structure will have a real effect on the pricing mechanism during phases of 
strong herding. Mathematically, this insight translates into the creation of a specific pattern in 
the price, with oscillations that are accelerating and form a discrete temporal hierarchy 
mirroring somehow the discrete social hierarchy of traders. Mathematically, the underlying 
symmetry is called discrete scale invariance (DSI) and is the manifestation of the hierarchical 
(non-continuous) scaling in the organization of traders and investors. As a result, during 
bubble phases, ever increasing oscillations with decreasing amplitude will be seen in the 
price. This is called log-periodicity. 
 
Remarkably, log-periodicity and DSI may occur spontaneously for entirely different causes. It 
may emerge from a purely dynamical origin, without a pre-existing hierarchy, as a 
consequence of the interplay between value traders and chartists, also called trend followers 
or technical traders. Suppose that an asset is quoted significantly under its expected 
fundamental value. In that case, buy orders by value traders will push the price up. This will 
generate a momentum that will be picked up by trend followers. As a consequence, the price 
will overshoot the fundamental value due to the inertia of investors when reassessing their 
expectation in the presence of uncertainty. The value traders will start selling and this will 
now drive the price down. A new momentum, this time in the opposite direction will be 
detected and be picked up again by the trend followers. This will cause the price to 
undershoot the fundamental value, what will prompt value traders to start buying again, 
setting in motion a new cycle. The interaction between technical traders that push the price 
out of balance and value traders that introduce a restoring force will generate oscillations. 
Taking into account that, in practice, traders make decisions to buy or sell when their signals 
are sufficiently strong, this creates a nonlinear threshold-like process and the oscillations 
become nonlinear. Nonlinear oscillations have, by definition, a frequency that depends on the 
amplitude. During the fast price appreciation of a bubble phase, the oscillations will have an 
ever-increasing frequency, implying that the inertia of investors when reassessing their 
expectation decreases. 
 
Such log-periodic oscillations have been reported in many dynamical systems like 
hydrodynamic turbulence, chemical and biological growth processes, material rupture, 
earthquakes and financial crashes [17]. These may have different types of self-similar or 
fractal-like properties and may hold pockets of predictability of an imminent regime shift. An 
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example from every-day life can be found in traffic jams where often oscillations can be 
experienced before the “phase transition” between the free-flowing and congested states. 
Additionally, it turns out that bats and dolphins use log-periodic chirps for echo-location 
during navigation and foraging. This is not incidental as such log-periodic chirps provide the 
optimum resolution of obstacles at multiple scales [18]. 
 
 
3.5 Diagnosing bubbles 
Our bubble model combines these specific oscillations with the hyperbolic power law in one 
single equation called the log-periodic power law (LPPL). The term “log-periodic” (LP) refers 
to the part of the equation that models the accelerating oscillations and the term “power law” 
(PL) handles the faster-than-exponential rise in the price, the fact that the growth rate itself 
grows due to feedback.  
 
The exact formula is given in Figure 7. Three different components are joined together to 
make one single model. The first term is the plain mathematical description of the smooth 
hyperbolic power law. The second term, controlling the amplitude, and the third cosine term 
combine to form the log-periodic oscillations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: The log-periodic power law (LPPL). In one single model, there are three precursors of the same critical 
time tc at which or around which a change of regime will occur. This equation has seven parameters. The 
constant term A is the expected value of the log-price at the peak when the end of the bubble is reached at time 
tc, the critical time. B and C respectively control the amplitude of the power law acceleration and of the log-
periodic oscillations. The exponent m, usually between 0 and 1 for a bubble, quantifies the degree of super-
exponential growth. The log-periodic angular frequency ω is related to the preferred scaling ratio of the temporal 
hierarchy of oscillations converging to the critical time tc. Finally, φ is a phase that quantifies the time scale of the 
oscillations. 
 
Each of these three parts models a separate process that in itself develops towards the 
same critical time tc: 
1. For 0<m<1, the first part of the equation takes care of the positive feedback 
mechanism, when price growth becomes unsustainable, and at tc the growth 
rate becomes infinite; 
2. The second part of the formula causes the amplitude of the oscillations to drop 
to zero at the critical time tc; 
3. Part three models the frequency of the oscillations, which becomes infinite at 
tc. 
 
Hunting for bubbles essentially involves looking for this specific pattern in the data. If the 
pattern of the log-periodic power law can be found with sufficiently strong statistical 
confidence, this is a clear indication of an unstable process, a bubble. This is illustrated in 
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Figure 8, in which a positive bubble pattern can be seen in the S&P500 in the years before, 
and a negative bubble pattern in the period during the crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: The pattern of a positive bubble (in green) and a negative bubble (in red) can be seen in the S&P500 
before and during the credit crisis. Notice the distinctive pattern combining oscillations with a faster-than-
exponential rise (or drop for a negative bubble) in the price. For both bubbles, the LPPL model is fitted to the data 
in the window between t1 and t2. The critical time tc is determined from the calibration of the model to the data in 
the corresponding windows; tc is the most probable time for the change in regime to occur, which may be a crash 
after a positive bubble or a rally following a negative bubble. 
 
Calibrating this model and its siblings developed in our group is not easy [19]. Extreme care 
should be exercised to prevent over-fitting (when a good apparent fit is the result of mere 
chance) and obtain robust calibrations. Here, we can barely touch on this vast field, simply 
stating that, after almost two decades of experimenting and improving the methodology, we 
have developed a process that is open to systematic ex-ante real-time testing, which we 
began in 2009 with the financial bubble experiments in the financial crisis observatory at ETH 
Zurich. Interested readers are encouraged to review the resources provided on the website 
of the Financial Crisis Observatory [20] and check the publications that report the progress 
and tests [21]. 
 
Our research suggests that bubbles occur on all possible time scales. This means that they 
can form, develop and mature over a period of an hour, but also over a period of a century. 
As we do not know the time base of the bubble, the key to hunting for bubbles is to scan the 
data using different window sizes. As a result, during bubbles, we will not have a single 
calibration with one critical time, as is indicated in Figure 8 for the sake of simplicity, but a full 
ensemble. This allows us to carry out a statistical analysis as shown in Figure 9. This shows 
the result of an analysis of the CHF/EUR exchange rate in the turbulent times when it flirted 
with parity in response to the European crisis. The alarm index for diagnostic of the bubble, 
calculated from the ensemble of fits, is shown in green; the black line represents the point at 
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which there was a 50 percent probability of a crash; the pink area gives the broader time 
frame within which the correction is to be expected. These analyses were performed ex-ante, 
before the “crash” of the Swiss franc actually occurred, as part of research performed in the 
FCO at ETH Zurich. Another example is given in Figure 10. This shows the prediction of a 
major correction that occurred after the build-up of a massive bubble for oil and other 
commodities in the middle of 2008.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: The CHF/EUR exchange rate in 2011 when the exchange rate flirted with parity. The figure shows the 
results of a statistical analysis of an ensemble of bubble model fits. The ensemble is obtained by scanning the 
data using different window sizes and combining them in a statistical analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: The historical development of oil prices (dotted line). The vertical dashed line shows the last 
observation used to calibrate our model. The coloured curves show different LPPL fits. The inset shows a 
magnification around the time of the peak. The correction was expected to occur with an 80 percent probability in 
the grey shaded zone. This indeed happened (reproduced from [22]). 
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As can be seen in the figures, both forecasts, which were made before the correction actually 
happened, turned out to be highly accurate. Over the past fifteen years, our group has 
performed a whole set of ex-ante predictions. For a detailed overview, we refer to one of our 
previous papers [4], the book Why Stock Markets Crash [23] and, again, the website of the 
Financial Crisis Observatory [20]. 
 
3.6 Distinction between the notion of a positive/negative bubble and over-/undervaluation 
It is important to stress that our bubble identification model is based on relative price 
changes and on the characterisation of the full dynamics, which are compared to a 
benchmark of exponential growth. This is fundamentally different from the more conventional 
approach of taking a snapshot of the price of an asset at a given time and comparing it with 
the best estimate of its fundamental value. In that approach, a bubble is identified when the 
observed market price is significantly higher than the estimated real value. In our 
methodology, rather than focusing on individual snapshots, we take a dynamical, movie-like 
view, in which it is not so much the price level that counts but the way it was reached. In 
effect, our methodology has nothing to say in itself about any possible mispricing. The key 
concept is that we identify dynamic market situations that are not sustainable and are bound 
to collapse at the climax of a positive bubble, or rally in the aftermath of a negative bubble. 
The collapse (or rally) may occur, again transiently, even if the price still remains too low (or 
high) compared to the fundamental value. 
 
It is important to distinguish two notions: (i) the transient non-sustainable exuberant market 
situations that our methodology identifies, and (ii) the existence of profound mispricing. 
Often, the two are closely related, as in the case documented in Figure 9, showing the 
CHF/EUR exchange rate during the European crisis in 2011. In the years before the crisis, 
the value of the euro in Swiss francs hovered in a range between 1.5 and 1.7, and it could be 
argued that this range was a market proxy for the fundamental value. In this sense, the 
accelerated appreciation of the CHF reaching parity in August 2011, with its characteristic 
super-exponential pattern, and the conclusion of a coming change, in the form of a collapse, 
resonates nicely with the belief that its correct fundamental value was (and still is) probably 
much lower. 
 
At other times, mispricing might proceed through a series of transient positive or negative 
bubbles, with several changes of regime. These two aspects actually differentiate two 
characteristics of bubble phenomenology: (a) the revelation, via market dynamics resulting 
from the collective actions of investors, of the existence of transient non-sustainable 
situations that will collapse or recover; (b), the possibility of very substantial, but not yet 
apparent, mispricing, indicating to smart investors the presence of an opportunity to sell or 
buy, perhaps over a period of many years, while the market has not yet collectively even 
acknowledged such a possibility. It is thus useful to distinguish between assets that are 
fundamentally over-/undervalued and assets that develop a positive -/negative bubble.  
 
This discussion reveals how difficult the identification of bubbles is. Essentially, the academic 
literature is mired in the debate on how to calculate mispricing. And few indeed are the 
professionals who are consistently correct in their assessment of real value. In other words, 
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as explained briefly in section 3.1, determining the fundamental value of an asset means 
entering a minefield of difficulties and assumptions; it absolutely needs to be done, but stable 
successes are rare. It is even doubtful whether a determination of fundamental value can be 
genuinely falsifiable in the Popperian sense. This stalemate has been one of our main 
motivations for developing an alternative approach to the identification of bubbles, in the form 
of a robust diagnostic of dynamic non-sustainable overvaluation. 
 
 
4- Synthesis 
 
After the thirty years of unsustainable debt growth and excessive financial expansion 
associated with a general belief in the illusory perpetual money machine [4], which collapsed 
abruptly in the 2007–2008 financial crisis, it might have been thought that the parties 
involved (regulators, policy-makers, banks and investors) would have learned from their 
mistakes, and taken measures to prevent the occurrence of new bubbles and other financial 
excesses. But it turns out that not much has been done, and the approach is still to push for 
growth through consumption, via debt, now sovereign rather than private, and with an even 
larger financial sector more concentrated in fewer huge banks that are more systemically 
important. It also seems that central bankers have the unofficial, but increasingly obvious, 
mandate to steer stock markets upward, somehow hoping that the artificial rise, which should 
normally discount positive future expectations on economic growth, becomes self-fulfilling. 
And clearly, since the rebound on the US stock market in March 2009 there has been a 
series of bubbles, relatively short-lived but nevertheless of substantial scale, and 
corresponding corrections.  
 
The daily analysis of financial markets in our observatory at ETH Zurich offers a sobering 
assessment of the presence of numerous bubbles in the world. These are in general not as 
massive as those that expanded before, and led to, the 2008 crisis, simply because they are 
developing over shorter periods. It also seems that there is an acceleration in the rate of 
formation and demise of bubbles, probably as a result of increasing algorithmic trading, more 
global interconnections between assets via ETFs and other financial instruments. Moreover, 
the importance of politics is drastically changing the balance of investments, in particular due 
to the successive waves of quantitative easing and extraordinary low interest rates that act 
as catalysts for a distorted allocation of resources. Since 2009, we have seen funds chasing 
returns in a twisted zero-rate environment, being seduced by the hyping of short-lived 
opportunities, such as the emerging markets, which promised so much a few years ago and 
are now in full correction.  
 
The models and the methodology that we have outlined in the previous sections are at the 
core of the Financial Crisis Observatory (FCO) of the ETH in Zurich. Using the Brutus 
supercomputer, twenty five thousand financial time series are monitored on a daily basis 
looking for that exact specific bubble fingerprint that we have explained here. This allows us 
to have a continuous overview of emerging bubbles in the global financial markets [25], 
which we synthesize in a coherent report. The report, available in the Notenstein white paper 
series (2014), with the title “Financial Bubbles: Mechanism, diagnostic and state of the world 
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(Feb. 2014)”, presents our view on the status of positive and negative bubbles in the financial 
markets, as of the end of January 2014 [26]. 
 
Our research gives strong quantitative support to the hypothesis developed by Hyman 
Minsky [24] that financial markets are inherently unstable, with speculative and Ponzi-type 
finance being the typical developments on unregulated or loosely regulated financial 
markets. While technological bubbles may have long-term benefits [2,3], the development of 
policies that create financial bubbles, and trigger an even greater need for investors to 
speculate, does not seem to be the right direction to be going in. Financial markets have 
essential functions in our economic system: pricing, providing efficient allocation of capital, 
and enabling the diversification of risk. But creating bubbles, riding them and trading in them, 
will not solve the problems that led to the crisis of 2007–2008. Also in financial markets, the 
law of diminishing returns applies. Hence “more market” does not necessarily mean “better 
market”. In the face of the waves of bubbles that encourage tactical, dynamic investing 
styles, it is time for economic and financial policy-makers to prioritise and promote “slow 
investment” associated with real fundamental value, for instance by taxing short-term 
(algorithmic) trading so that financial markets can once again fulfil their function as catalysts 
of prosperity. 
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